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THE SENSORY PRESENTATION 
OF DIVINE INFINITY* 
Edward L. Schoen 
Reliable as well as unreliable indicators playa crucial role in various types of ordinary per-
ceptual encounter. Since perceptual indicators may function perfectly well without any 
connection whatever to essences or essential natures, it is possible to find ways in which 
divine infinity may be perceptually encountered and even recognized as such in the course 
of ordinary human experience. 
About two decades ago, John Hick accepted verificationist criteria as reasonable 
standards by which to judge the factual meaningfulness of utterances. In his 
Faith and Knowledge, he noted that the details of Christian conceptions of God 
present several particularly difficult problems for verificationists. According to 
Hick, one of these problems arises from the fact that 
God is described in Christian theology in terms of various absolute quali-
ties, such as omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, infinite 
love, etc., which cannot as such be observed by us, as can their finite 
analogues, limited power, local presence, finite goodness, and human 
love. One can recognize that a being whom one 'encounters' has a given 
finite degree of power, but how does one recognize that he has unlimited 
power? How does one observe that an encountered being is omnipresent? 
How does one perceive that his goodness and love, which one can per-
haps see to exceed any human goodness and love, are actually infinite? 
Such qualities cannot be given in human experience.' 
Of course, the dramatic demise of the Positivist program has stripped the context 
of this argument of its original vitality. In recent years, verifiability criteria for 
cognitive meaningfulness as well as Hick's creative struggles to meet such criteria 
have lost much of their attraction. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to dismiss 
the content of this passage along with its original context. After all, the funda-
mental desire to trace evidential links between the ordinary course of human ex-
perience and religious belief remains as powerful as ever. 21f Hick is correct in his 
contentions, formidable barriers lie in the path of those who would seek experien-
tial access to a God that conforms to the descriptions of traditional Christian 
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theology. According to Hick, absolute qualities such as omnipotence or infinite 
love cannot be given in human experience. So, even if there were some way in 
which experiential contact with an infinite divine being could be achieved, such 
a being could not be perceived or recognized as infinite. 
Before moving to a reconsideration of Hick's position, a few preliminary 
distinctions must be drawn. First, care should be taken to distinguish perceptual 
encounters from perceptual recognitions. People frequently perceive objects that 
they do not recognize. A string of specks on the horizon may be seen without 
being recognized as a caravan of camels. So, for the sake of clarity, issues 
surrounding the possibility of perceptually recognizing divine infinity as infinite 
should be kept quite distinct from those associated with the more basic attempt 
to encounter such infinity perceptually. 
Second, two quite different types of perceptual encounter must be distin-
guished. Frequently, people see things like books or trees. In cases of this sort, 
that which is perceptually encountered is sensuously presented to the observer. 
Ordinarily, such acts are called perceptions and this commonplace nomenclature 
will be adopted here as well. Detections contrast strikingly with perceptions. In 
perceptual detections, that which is detected is not itself sensuously presented, 
though its presence may be detected in the sensuous presentation of something 
else. Fred Dretske provides a clear example in his description of Orfians. Orfians 
are strongly magnetic, though invisible. So, while they cannot be perceived by 
human beings, their presence may be detected by watching the behavior of 
surrounding metal objects. 3 Less fancifully, doctors detect the presence of germs 
in the sensuous presentation of symptomatic skin rashes. Since detection provides 
a way in which imperceptibles may be encountered in the perception of sensibles, 
'perceptual encounter' will be stretched to function as a generic term covering 
both perceptions and detections in this discussion. 
Finally, various sorts of perceptual objects should be differentiated. In the 
course of ordinary life, people appear to perceive things as widely diverse as 
physical objects, qualities, motions and states of affairs. 4 Confronted with a 
marching band, bystanders may shift from observing individual players to 
watching the band as a whole. They may move attention away from the color 
of the uniforms to the whirl of the drumsticks. For the purposes of this discussion, 
however, the range of perceptual objects can be restricted fairly narrowly to 
include only beings, attributes, manifestations of beings and manifestations of 
attributes. 
With these distinctions in mind, it will be the burden of the following discussion 
to argue, contrary to the position of Hick, that nothing in the nature of either 
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ordinary human perception or divine infinity stands in the way of perceptually 
detecting the presence of divine infinite beings or attributes. Furthermore, such 
detections may permit the recognition of such beings or attributes as infinite. 
Beyond mere detection, it also will be argued that manifestations of divine 
infinite beings as well as manifestations of infinite attributes may be perceived 
and even recognized as such. More tentatively, the possibility of actually per-
ceiving divine beings or attributes that may be recognized as infinite will be 
explored. 
II 
It might seem appropriate to begin with an investigation into the precise nature 
of divine infinity. In this connection, the work of Thomas Aquinas would provide 
a convenient, and classically Christian, point of departure. In his Summa Contra 
Gentiles, Aquinas efficiently cataloged many of the diverse elements included 
in his own reflections upon the nature of divine infinity. He argued that God 
should be conceived as infinite because, among other things, he is perfect, his 
nature surpasses the limitations of generic categorization, he does not depend 
upon anything else for his existence, he is pure act, containing no potency, he 
is a necessary being and he is the greatest conceivable being. 5 
As would be expected, Aquinas tied much of his elaborate conception of God's 
infinity directly to the particularities of his metaphysics. Throughout his discus-
sion, however, he took special pains to avoid the use of grossly quantitative 
ideas. As he stressed, 
Since, as the philosophers teach, 'the infinite accompanies quantity,' 
infinity cannot be attributed to God on the ground of multitude. For we 
have shown that there is only one God and that no composition of parts 
or accidents is found in Him. Nor, again, according to continuous 
quantity can God be called infinite, since we have shown that He is 
incorporeal. 6 
Distinguishing his own position from those of previous philosophers, Aquinas 
argued, 
The sayings of the most ancient philosophers are likewise a witness 
to this truth. They all posited an infinite first principle of things, as 
though compelled by truth itself. Yet they did not recognize their own 
voice. They judged the infinity of the first principle in terms of discrete 
quantity .... Or they judged infinity in terms of continuous quan-
tity . .. But, since it was shown by the effort of later philosophers 
that there is no infinite body, given that there must be a first principle 
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that is in some way infinite, we conclude that the infinite which is the 
first principle is neither a body nor a power in a body. 7 
In spite of such insistence, David Hume chose to move in a decidedly contrary 
direction when he wrote, 
The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good 
Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and 
augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. 8 
Whether Hume intended this as a recipe for constructing adequate conceptions 
of divine infinity or merely as a psychological description of the way in which 
people actually try to construct such ideas may be unclear. What remains clear, 
however, is his explicitly quantitative thrust. He began by moving in a direction 
exactly opposite to that of Aquinas. 
Fortunately, for the sake of this discussion, it is not necessary to take sides 
on this or any other debate over the nature of divine infinity. In the attempt to 
determine whether infinite beings or attributes may be perceptually encountered 
or recognized as infinite in the course of normal human experience, there is no 
need to discern the essential nature of any particular infinite being or attribute. 
It is not even necessary to know what might constitute some specifically Christian 
conception of divine infinity. Such matters can be sidestepped altogether by 
relying upon a couple of facts about human perception. 
First of all, it should be noted that people may perceptually encounter and 
even recognize objects without knowing, perceiving or detecting anything about 
essential natures. Consider ordinary experiences of maple trees. People sometimes 
see maples. 9 One thing that might be meant by this unsurprising remark is that 
people occasionally see things that turn out to be maple trees. That is, they see 
objects that, as a matter of fact, are maples even though for one reason or another 
they are not recognized as such at the time of perception. Of course, there are 
all sorts of things that might prohibit the recognition of perceived objects as 
maples. A thick fog may shroud the trees, making them difficult to discern. 
Perhaps the observers are unsophisticated in their knowledge of trees, knowing 
enough to identify what confronts them as trees, but unable to distinguish species. 
Whatever the case might be, in this first sort of perceptual encounter with maples, 
percipients are confronted sensuously with things that are in fact maples, though 
not recognized as such. 
A second way of encountering maples involves the perception of things that 
are not immediately recognized as maples, but subsequently are consciously 
inferred to be maples. In this sort of case, percipients are presented with objects 
that may be recognized as trees, green things, physical objects or something 
else. At the moment of perception, however, they are not recognized as maples. 
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Nevertheless, sufficient perceptual clues are available by which percipients may 
draw the conscious inference that the objects being perceived are, in fact, maples. 
Typically, in cases of this sort, percipients depend upon the presence of reliable 
indicators. Sometimes such indicators provide natural clues. For instance, obser-
vers might spot certain trees, noticing the presence of specially shaped leaves. 
Recalling that only maple trees bear such leaves, these observers might conclude 
correctly that the trees under scrutiny are maples. At other times, the clues used 
by percipients may be utterly arbitrary. For instance, as they enter an arboretum, 
visitors might be told that trees with red paint blotches are maples. In their 
wanderings, such visitors could see trees, notice the color of their paint blotches 
and subsequently consciously infer that the specimens under observation were 
maples. 
A third way of perceptually encountering maples involves immediate recogni-
tion. This sort of case might be described as one in which people simply see 
maple trees as maples. In contrast with the second way of encountering maples, 
people who see maples in this third way do not first see objects as something 
else and then subsequently consciously infer those things to be maples. Without 
the aid of conscious inference, they simply see what they recognize to be maples. 
There is still much controversy over the exact nature of such acts of immediate 
perceptual recognition. Clearly, since they are perceptual rather than purely 
intellectual acts, percipients must take advantage of certain clues or reliable 
indicators that are present in their perceptual fields. Exactly which perceptual 
clues are the most important ones and precisely how they are processed remains 
a matter of some mystery. Some theorists are convinced that such seemingly 
immediate perceptual recognitions, though lacking acts of conscious inference, 
still require certain inference patterns. Various unconscious, virtually instantane-
ous, inferences based upon perceptual clues lie at the heart of such perceptual 
recognitions. For example, with regard to maples, percipients unconsciously use 
visible indicators, such as the shapes of leaves, to infer with lightning speed the 
sort of tree being observed. Others hypothesize that perceptual clues are processed 
by Gestalt mechanisms or elaborate neural structures. 10 
Happily, for the purposes of this discussion, nothing depends upon the adoption 
of any particular fine analysis of the processing of perceptual clues in such acts. 
It is sufficient to note that, at times, people possess the necessary equipment, 
be it inferential, purely perceptual, neural or whatever, to recognize maples 
immediately as maples. For present purposes, this ability need be understood 
no more specifically than as the capacity to use perceptual indicators for recog-
nizing maples without having to rely upon conscious inference patterns. 
In each of the cases described so far, maples are sensuously presented. As 
would be expected, reliable indications of maples are not processed, as such, in 
cases where perceived trees are not recognized as maples. When perception is 
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coupled with recognition, however, reliable indicators come into play. In cases 
of perceptual detection, where maples are not sensuously presented, reliable 
indicators playa more pervasive role. Every perceptual detection requires some 
act of recognition based upon the sensuous presentation of reliable indicators. 
People never just perceptually detect. They always use perceived indicators to 
detect the presence of something that is recognized, at the very least, as something 
or other. Suppose all the plants at the local arboretum have been tented for 
fumigation. Trees, including maples, are covered with red tents while shrubs 
are shrouded in white. Unless visitors at the arboretum take tents to be reliably 
indicative of the presence of something or other underneath, nothing whatever 
that is concealed by the tents will be detected. This minimal realization, however, 
is sufficient to permit rudimentary perceptual detections. Visitors can detect the 
presence of unperceived plants by using tents as reliable indicators to infer 
consciously the presence of things recognized not as plants, but merely as some-
thing or other. Should visitors be told that red tents cover only trees, the recog-
nition involved in their detections would proceed somewhat differently. Tent 
colors would be used to infer consciously the presence of things recognized as 
trees. In either of these cases, if maples were concealed beneath the tents, visitors 
would be able to detect the presence of maples without recognizing them as 
such. Certainly, in order to be detected, the maples would have to be recognized 
as something. But they might be recognized only as plants or trees rather than 
as maples. Of course, if visitors knew that only maples had red covers, this 
more precise information could be used for detecting the presence of maples that 
were recognized as such. As in the case of perceptual recognition already con-
sidered, a little repetition might permit the conscious inferences employed in 
these assorted acts of detection to be replaced by the ability to process reliable 
indicators without the necessity of conscious inference. 
In bringing all of this to bear upon questions regarding the possibility of 
experientially encountering infinite beings or attributes, it must be stressed that 
none of the ways of encountering maples just described requires any knowledge, 
perception or even detection of the essential nature of maples. Presumably, if 
maples have essences at all, they are tied somehow to matters of genetics. II If 
botanists could be persuaded to use such terminology, perhaps they would argue 
that the essential nature of maples resides in some elaborate, fairly unique, 
genetic structure. Whatever botanists might say on this topic, however, it is 
important to notice that ordinary percipients need to know nothing about such 
matters. Even if maples should turn out to have no essential nature at all, 
perceptually encountering as well as recognizing them would remain unproblema-
tic. All that is required for perceptual encounter is the presence of maples. In 
order to be perceived, maples must be sensuously presented. If they are to be 
detected, something indicative of their presence must be sensuously presented 
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and taken, at least minimally, as indicative of something or other. In neither 
case do essences play any crucial role. If perceived or detected objects are to 
be recognized as maples, reliable indicators must be processed more specifically. 
Such indicators, whether processed with or without the aid of conscious inference, 
need bear no special relation to essences. Of course, reliable indicators might 
be produced by essential natures, as would be the case with leaf shape on the 
supposition that the essential nature of maples lies in their genetic structure. 
Alternatively, such indicators might be purely conventional, as in the case where 
an arboretum uses red paint blotches or tents to aid visitors. Furthermore, it is 
not necessary that everyone use the same indicators. Some might rely upon the 
shapes of leaves or tents while others use color codes. 
What has been said about perceptually encountering or recognizing objects 
applies equally to encounters with attributes. 12 Some percipients, particularly 
young ones, might be sensuously presented with five-sidedness, though unable 
to recognize it as such. Others may consciously infer five-sidedness on the basis 
of reliable indicators. Knowing that they have five fingers on each hand, they 
might conclude that an observed figure is five-sided after touching each side 
with a finger and noticing no leftover fingers or sides. Yet other viewers might 
work toward improving their capacities of visual discrimination so that five-sided-
ness might be recognized as such without conscious inference. Similarly, in 
cases of detection, if variously shaped objects were cloaked in red, percipients 
might detect the presence of what was, in fact, five-sidedness, recognizing it 
merely as some shape or other. If only five-sided blocks bore red tents, however, 
those same percipients might use this additional information to detect the presence 
of five-sidedness, recognizing it as such either with or without the aid of conscious 
inference. In none of these cases, whether they involve perception, detection or 
recognition as five-sidedness, is any knowledge, perception or detection of 
essences required. 
III 
Once it is realized that beings as well as attributes may be perceived, detected 
and even recognized quite specifically without taking recourse to essences, it is 
possible to overcome one of the most important obstacles raised by Hick. 
According to Hick, it is the fact that infinite divine beings or attributes are 
unrestricted in some radically unlimited way that prohibits their perceptual acces-
sibility. He concedes that human beings may perceive as well as recognize such 
things as limited power or love. Because of this, a God of finite power or love 
might be encountered in the course of ordinary experience and even recognized 
as finite. But the very restricted and limited nature of human perception bars 
perceptual encounters with infinites as infinites. 
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This line of objection rests upon the conviction that infinite beings or attributes 
are unrestricted or unlimited in some very fundamental, radical way. For the 
sake of argument, this may be granted. In fact, it may even be conceded that 
the very essence of divine infinity is connected with some type of radical lack 
of restriction or limitation. The mistake to be avoided, however, lies in the 
assumption that in order for infinite beings or attributes to be perceptually encoun-
tered or recognized as infinite, this fundamental or even essential feature of 
unlimitedness must be encountered. As has been seen, neither perception nor 
detection requires the presentation of essences. Furthermore, recognition proceeds 
on the basis of reliable indicators, indicators that need bear no special relation 
to essences or essential natures. 
Because perceptual encounter as well as recognition can occur without reference 
to essences, even if some Christian conception of divine infinity were constructed 
along Humean lines and emerged as essentially quantitative, perceptual encoun-
ters or recognitions would not be prohibited. Quantitative infinites would not 
have to be presented as infinitely large. They might be encountered on a minuscule 
scale. Given the right indicators, such infinites could even be recognized as 
unrestrictedl y large in tiny, finite presentations. 
It might seem that this form of response to Hick cannot succeed unless divine 
infinity can be presented in the ways in which maples or five-sidedness are 
presented. Although the sheer infinity of the divine may not prohibit such presen-
tation, Christian tradition teaches that God is incorporeal. Taking inspiration 
from the work of Robert Oakes, it might be argued that 
... it seems unproblematic that being incorporeal is ... a property 
that God has essentially, and that the function 'X is incorporeal' entails 
the function 'X is unobservable'. Hence, since 'If God exists, he is 
incorporeal' expresses a necessary truth, it should be intuitively clear 
that the proposition expressed by 'If God exists, he is unobservable' is 
also a necessary truth. 13 
Granting the acceptability of this argument, it might be claimed that the suggested 
analogy between encounters with maples and encounters with God crumbles. 
While maples may be encountered and recognized in the ways described, this 
is because they are observable. An infinite, incorporeal God, being essentially 
unobservable, cannot be so encountered. Similarly, it might be argued that since 
God's attributes are incorporeal, they too are essentially unobservable. Hence, 
a radical disanalogy between encounters with observables like five-sidedness 
and unobservables like infinite love or power must be acknowledged. 
Before conceding the cogency of these lines of objection, it must be remem-
bered that several distinct ways in which maples and five-sidedness might be 
perceptually encountered or recognized have been outlined. Each requires that 
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something, though not necessarily maples or five-sidedness, be observable. When 
maples or five-sidedness remain unobservable, their presence can still be detected 
and their identity determined through the proper use of observed reliable indi-
cators. So, if the proper relations among incorporeality, unobservability and the 
possibility of perceptually encountering divine infinity or recognizing it as such 
are to be traced, it would seem necessary to proceed more cautiously. 
Consider first the problem of merely detecting the presence of divine infinity. 
Since nothing of substance turns upon which divine attribute is considered, 
attention can be limited conveniently to a consideration of any infinite characteris-
tic. Take infinite love, for example. Furthermore, since nothing under consider-
ation here depends upon the advantages of taking one sense modality rather than 
another, for the sake of convenience, consider only vision. Finally, some reliable 
indicator presented within the perceptual vicinity of human beings must be 
assumed. Consider the emergence of early spring grass as a reliable indicator of 
infinite love. 
In perceptual detections, that which is detected remains unobserved. Some-
times, of course, whatever is detected is itself observable. This is the case with 
concealed maples or five-sidedness. But other times, that which is detected is 
by its very nature unobservable. Scientists using visible tracks on photographic 
plates to detect the presence of electrons find themselves in this situation. Elec-
trons are unobservable in principle because they are too small to reflect 
wavelengths of visible light. Since even things that are essentially unobservable 
may be detected, conceding the essential unobservability of either God or his 
attributes does not prohibit the possibility of their perceptual detection. 
If something unobserved is to be perceptually detected, a reliable indicator 
must be sensuously presented. In this regard, early spring grass presents no 
difficulties whatever, being an uncontroversial, perhaps even paradigmatic, per-
ceptual object. Of course, spring grass must actually be a reliable indicator of 
infinite love. But this may be accomplished in any number of ways. It might be 
nothing more than an arbitrary sign of God's infinite love, similar in this respect 
to red tents concealing the presence of maples or five-sidedness. More likely, 
perhaps, early spring grass might be produced by God's love. In this case, it 
would be more like the distinctively shaped leaves found on maples. The details 
of the connection between early spring grass and infinite love are unimportant, 
so long as the grass reliably indicates divine love. 
In perceptual detections, percipients recognize the presence of something by 
using reliable indicators. What precisely is recognized as present depends heavily 
upon what the available indicators are taken to indicate. This may vary widely 
from case to case. Unsophisticated percipients might take early spring grass to 
indicate merely the presence of something, they know not what. In this case, 
the presence of infinite love would be detected, recognized as something or 
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other, but not recognized as infinite love. Other percipients, armed with more 
specific information about what spring grass reliably indicates, might detect the 
presence of infinite love and recognize it as such. In this latter sort of case, the 
recognition of infinite love might proceed on the basis of conscious inference 
or, as with more practiced observers, without requiring conscious inference. 
In each of these cases, it might seem that spring grass, being a reliable indicator 
of the presence of infinite love, functions also as a visible manifestation of that 
love. From this natural assumption, one might conclude that, although infinite 
love or an infinitely loving God may remain essentially unobservable, their 
manifestations can be perceived and even recognized as such. Unfortunately, 
this tempting move is slightly premature. The mere fact that something functions 
as a reliable indicator of the presence of something else is insufficient to ensure 
its status as a manifestation. Consider birds. Various chirpings and f1utterings 
may reliably indicate the presence of birds. They also may be characterized as 
manifestations of the birds. Suppose, however, that clear weather appears only 
when birds are present. By functioning as an adventitious sign, clear weather 
may reliably indicate the presence of birds without being a manifestation of those 
birds. In order to be a manifestation of the birds, clear weather would have to 
be produced in an appropriate way by the birds. Similarly, if spring grass is to 
function as a manifestation of infinite love, rather than merely as an adventitious 
sign, it must be produced in an appropriate way. 
Of course, whether or not God produces spring grass in an appropriate way 
has nothing whatever to do with human perceptual capacities. Rather, it depends 
upon the nature of God's loving activities. If God were to choose to produce 
spring grass appropriately, however, then it would become possible to perceive 
emerging grass as a visible manifestation of infinite love. As in other cases of 
human perception, manifestations of infinite love could be perceived without 
being recognized as such. All that would be required is a rather rudimentary 
perceptual awareness of the grass. In order to move beyond this basic level of 
perceptual awareness to the recognition of spring grass as a manifestation of 
infinite love, percipients would have to employ reliable indicators, indicators 
not of the mere presence of that love, but rather of its manifestation. As with 
any reliable indicator, such indicators might or might not be connected in any 
essential way with infinite love. Furthermore, they might or might not be used 
consciously. Percipients who saw spring grass as something other than a manifes-
tation of infinite love might spot appropriate indicators in their perceptual fields 
and subsequently consciously infer that the grass was, in fact, a manifestation 
of infinite love. Those who processed such indicators without recourse to con-
scious inference would see spring grass immediately as a manifestation of infinite 
love. Of course, what precisely was recognized in these assorted acts of perceptual 
recognition would depend upon what the indicators were taken to indicate. They 
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might be taken to indicate a manifestation of either infinite love or an infinitely 
loving being. 
IV 
If infinite love itself, rather than just its manifestations, is to be perceived, it 
must be sensuously presented. In order to be recognized as infinite love, reliable 
indicators must be processed as well. Until now, the possibility of actually 
perceiving divine infinity has been blocked by arbitrarily assuming that the 
doctrine of incorporeality entails the essential unobservability of God and his 
attributes. If this assumption is questioned, it may be possible to find ways of 
perceiving and even recognizing either infinite love or an infinitely loving God. 
Given the parameters of the present discussion, only the possibilities lying 
within the realm of ordinary human experience will be explored. Possibilities 
latent in mystical visions, nonsensuous intuitions or other extraordinary forms 
of perceptual encounter will be left untouched. As a convenient point of departure, 
consider the work of Richard Swinburne. In The Coherence of Theism , he depicts 
certain activities of God as basic actions. According to Swinburne, a basic action 
of an agent is " ... one which he performs without having to perform some 
other action in order to do it."14 Furthermore, " ... God is supposed to be able 
to move any part of the universe directly; he does not need to use one part of 
the universe to make another part move. He can make any part move as a basic 
action. "15 
Suppose, then, that certain observable occurrences, such as the emergence of 
spring grass, were basic actions of God. This would not necessarily mean that 
God was corporeal. Dualists can concede that certain bodily movements are 
basic actions of human beings while maintaining with perfect consistency that 
people are essentially incorporeal spirits. Furthermore, as Swinburne notes, 
claiming that certain observable occurrences are basic actions of God does not 
imply that God is embodied. Embodied creatures feel disturbances in their bodies, 
look out upon the world from a specifiable perspective and become hungry when 
their stomachs are empty. Because embodiment involves much more than the 
simple capacity to move physical parts directly, God might remain disembodied 
by refusing to become entangled in these additional relationships with his world. 16 
Now suppose that an infinitely loving God were to produce spring grass as a 
basic action. Whether seeing that grass could count as perceiving either infinite 
love or an infinitely loving God would depend upon the precise relationships 
among the grass, infinite love and God. Because nothing can be perceived unless 
it is sensuously presented to some percipient, it is important to realize that only 
spring grass is sensuously presented in this example. Unless God can be identified 
either in whole or in part with that grass, it will not be possible to perceive him. 
14 Faith and Philosophy 
While pantheists might penn it such an identification, traditional theists would 
seem compelled to repudiate it, thereby abandoning the possibility of perceiving 
an infinitely loving being in emerging spring grass. 
The possibility that a divine attribute, such as that of infinite love, might be 
sensuously present in a perception of spring grass does not dissipate quite so 
quickly, though it too appears problematic. Under the most natural interpretation, 
infinite love might be conceived as being some relatively high level disposition or, 
perhaps, some set of activated states in the mind of God. Given an understanding 
of divine love along these lines, emerging grass could not be identified as all or 
part of God's love. Spring grass could be produced by God out of infinite love, of 
course. Under these conditions, however, infinite love itself would remain hidden 
in the depths of God, leaving spring grass as nothing more than a sign, effect or 
visible manifestation of divine love. While infinite love might be detectable in the 
emergence of spring grass, it would not be sensuously presented. 
Suppose, however, that a strictly behaviorist interpretation of infinite love were 
adopted. That is, suppose infinite love were identified with some collection of 
manifest behaviors. On this account, the production of spring grass could be in-
cluded, quite literally, as a part of infinite love. Under this interpretation, part of 
infinite love would be sensuously present in a perceptual encounter with spring 
grass. Since, in ordinary human experience, attributes as well as beings may be 
perceived without being apprehended in their entirety, infinite love would be per-
ceptible in the presentation of spring grass. Obviously, it would not have to be 
recognized as such. But by employing reliable indicators, percipients could either 
consciously infer that grass to be infinite love or, without conscious inference, 
immediately recognize infinite love in the presentation of spring grass. In the latter 
case, they would simply see spring grass as infinite love. 
The obvious problem with this approach to perceiving infinite love lies with 
the difficulty of accepting such a thoroughly behavioristic analysis. But strict 
behaviorism is not absolutely necessary. A more chastened behaviorism would do. 
Suppose infinite love were not reducible totally to a collection of manifest be-
haviors. Perhaps only a small part of it could be so analyzed. This would be suffi-
cient to allow that part of infinite love to be sensuously present in an experience of 
spring grass. Abandoning behaviorism altogether, if some plausible analysis of 
divine infinity could be developed wherein at least a part of some infinite attribute 
could be identified with something perceptible, then it would be possible to find 
ways in which that attribute could be perceived and even recognized as such. With-
out such an analysis, however, it is necessary to rest content with detections or the 
perception of manifestations of divine infinity. 
v 
Throughout this discussion, a heavy burden has been placed upon the assumption 
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that emerging spring grass could be taken as a reliable indicator of infinite love. 
A few objections to this assumption must be faced. Probably, the most obvious 
initial objection is that the selection of early spring grass as a reliable indicator 
is a poor choice. Perhaps significant theological reasons for repudiating the 
selection of spring grass can be found. Maybe God would be demeaned by 
displaying infinite love in this way. 
It is important to notice that this kind of objection is utterly misdirected. 
Nothing whatever turns upon the question of whether spring grass is actually 
the right choice as a reliable indicator of God's infinite love. For the purposes 
of this consideration, any reliable indicator located in the perceptual vicinity of 
human beings will do. The arguments offered can be modified quite easily to 
suit candidates thought to be more suitable than spring grass. 
Even if it is conceded that God might display infinite love in the emergence 
of spring grass, this particular choice might still be rejected as a reliable indicator 
on the simple grounds that, as a matter of fact, it is not reliable. Due to the 
mysteries and complexities of the divine nature, infinite love is never manifested 
in simple, predictable ways. While sometimes God's love is manifested in the 
emergence of spring grass, in times of drought there is no reason to conclude 
that the lack of grass indicates a dearth of divine love. For that matter, there 
may be circumstances in which the emergence of spring grass would be an 
indication of divine displeasure rather than a sign of love. In times of plentiful 
hay supplies, more spring grass might be viewed as a curse rather than a blessing. 
Even the location of spring grass could make a difference. Perhaps the grass 
that comes up in rose gardens or com fields should be taken as a manifestation 
of malevolence, rather than love. In short, due to the complexities of divine 
activity, the vicissitudes of nature and other variables, early spring grass, at best, 
is a very unreliable indicator of divine infinite love. 
Although this thread of objection complicates matters somewhat, it does not 
generate insuperable problems. Unreliable indicators can be used just as effec-
tively as reliable ones for purposes of perceptual detection and recognition. 
Certain skin rashes are unreliable indicators of measles. Some people get rashes 
without having measles and measles victims display marked differences in their 
susceptibility to rashes. Nevertheless, such rashes are used commonly as indi-
cators of measles. What is required is not some general, exceptionless principle 
of association between certain rashes and measles. All that is needed is some 
reason to believe that some particular manifestation of a rash is indicative of 
measles. In fact, when children are at just the right age and there is an epidemic 
afoot, the quest for additional confirmation of measles may be unnecessary. 
Under just the right conditions, it might be sufficient simply to note that there 
is no reason to doubt the reliability of the rash indicator. 17 
Bringing the example into closer analogy with the manifestation of divine 
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love, consider the manifestation of human love. A pat on the head is an unreliable 
indicator of human love. Some people love without patting and others pat without 
love. Indeed, the same individual may sometimes manifest love by patting, 
indicate patronizing contempt by patting or, knowing that physical contact is 
embarrassing to the self-conscious, show love by suppressing the impulse to pat. 
Since patting irregularly indicates human love, what is needed is some reason 
to believe or, perhaps, no reason to doubt that a particular instance of patting 
indicates human love. In similar fashion, as an unreliable indicator, early spring 
grass need not invariably or unfailingly indicate divine love. While it may fail 
as a proper indicator on many or even most occasions, it can still indicate infinite 
love under conditions where there is reason to believe or, perhaps, no reason to 
doubt its reliability as indicative of divine love. 
This admission of unreliable as well as reliable indicators seems to demand 
that something be said about the ways in which indicators are determined. How 
would anyone discover whether spring grass is an indicator, reliable or otherwise, 
of infinite love? Put more generally, how could percipients find out what in their 
perceptual fields is indicative of what? 
Strictly speaking, this last problem falls beyond the scope of issues considered 
here. The present discussion has focussed upon the nature and limitations of 
human perception. More specifically, attention has centered upon ways in which 
divine infinity may be perceptually accessible. In the course of this investigation, 
it has been found that religious percipients rely rather heavily upon information 
about what reliably or unreliably indicates divine infinity. Where percipients get 
such information however, is a separate question, one about the epistemology 
of religious belief. Certainly, how percipients know or are justified in believing 
that something indicates divine infinity is a significant, difficult question. What 
must be emphasized, however, is that the analysis of perception offered here 
stands entirely separate from the details of any answer that might be given. 
Consider a few. It might be argued, rather simplistically, that information 
about indicators is provided by revelation. Alternatively, it might be claimed 
that beliefs about indicators are either properly basic or derivable from properly 
basic beliefs. Perhaps it could be argued that unsophisticated believers rely upon 
information provided by theological experts in the way that visitors at an 
arboretum depend upon the advice of curators. '" In tum, the experts might be 
thought to obtain their information in ways parallel to those by which physicists 
discover that tracks on photographic plates indicate the presence of negatively 
charged particles. 19 Whatever the details might be, so long as appropriate beliefs 
about indicators have been obtained, percipients would be able to detect the 
presence of infinite attributes or beings, either recognizing or failing to recognize 
them as infinite. They also would be able to detect or perceive manifestations 
of infinite attributes or beings, recognizing or failing to recognize them as such. 
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Unfortunately, unless some plausible way could be found by which at least 
fragments of infinite attributes or beings could be identified with something 
sensuously presentable, divine infinites themselves would remain beyond the 
range of human perception. 
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